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ABSTRACT 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been contentious for more than 
three decades. Only 24 countries grow GMOs commercially. Four countries (USA, 
Canada, Brazil and Argentina) account for 85% of the global GMO hectares. Four 
crops (soy, corn, cotton and canola) account for 99% of GM hectares. Despite the 
veneer of social validity that regulators cast, the GMO sector has failed to gain a 
social licence. Where GM labelling is required, food manufacturers avoid GM 
ingredients. GMOs have failed to gain price parity with their non-GM counterparts, 
and they attract price penalties. Segregation of GMOs and non-GMOs has failed 
(with a tolerance of 0.9% GM contamination in so-called non-GM canola). GM has 
failed the coexistence test with a GMO growers contaminating neighbouring farms. 
GMOs are a biosecurity fail, with test plots of GM canola planted in the late 1990s 
still monitored two decades later for rogue canola plants. Most GMO crops are 
glyphosate dependent. Glyphosate is globally subject to massive litigation claims 
and awards, and is implicated in the causation of multiple cancers. Mechanisms for 
compensating farms contaminated by GMOs are lacking. The GMO industry has 
taken no responsibility for contaminations. GMOs are a threat to the organic sector 
and the maintenance of certification and price premiums. Most countries (88%) do 
not grow GMO crops. This paper considers the global experience of GMOs and the 
Australian experience as a microcosm of the global experience and as a case study. 
 
Keywords: Genetically engineered crops, GM canola, GM cotton, Marsh v Baxter, 
glyphosate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The global adoption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has been limited 
despite three decades of robust marketing. Four countries of North and South 
America account for 85% of global GMO hectares: USA (40%), Brazil, (26%) 
Argentina (12%), and Canada (7%). Another 20 countries have some GMO crops. 
The global total of GMO hectares is 189.8 million hectares. (ISAAA, 2017a). Most 
countries (88%) have no GMO hectares.  
 
Globally, four GMO crops account for almost all (>99%) of the world’s GM crops: 
soy (50%), corn (31%), cotton (13%), and canola (5%) (ISAAA, 2017a). Two of 
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these ‘big four’ commercial GM crops, cotton and canola, are grown in Australia 
(OGTR, 2018b). Most countries (n=17) with commercial GMO grow just one or 
two GM crops (OGTR, 2018b). Any GM crop in Australia must be first approved 
by the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR), based in Canberra. As 
elsewhere, there has been a bifurcation of views. GMOs have, from the outset, met 
with scepticism and rejection by Australian consumers, while being embraced and 
promoted by Australian university agriculture departments and the CSIRO (e.g. 
OGTR, 2019). This disparity of views persists to the present time. The clash of 
views is perhaps a part of the modern trend, borne of recent experience, to distrust 
experts (Shaw, 2016). The present paper examines the global experience of GMOs, 
it draws on the Australian experience as a case study, and it reveals multiple facets 
of the failures of the GMO farming sector.  
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
The present paper draws on multiple sources, including surveys of consumer 
attitudes over the past decade, longitudinal price data of GMOs, longitudinal 
plantings data of GMOs, legal trial and appeal documents, including evidence and 
judgements in the Marsh v Baxter case (where an organic grower, Marsh, sued a 
neighbouring GMO grower, Baxter, for economic losses, including loss of organics 
premium, due to loss of organics certification caused by GM contamination), and 
documentation (including submissions, hearings transcripts, and the official report) 
of the Parliamentary Inquiry into mechanisms for compensation for economic loss 
to farmers in Western Australia due to contamination by genetically modified 
material. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Australia offers a microcosm of the global experience of GMOs.It is a minor player 
in the world of GMO agriculture, and it accounts for 0.4% of the world’s GMO 
agriculture (ABCA, 2019; Cotton Australia, 2019; ISAAA, 2017b). There are two 
GM crops commercially grown in Australia, GM canola and GM cotton (ISAAA, 
2018). GMO agriculture in Australia accounts for 0.2% of Australian agricultural 
hectares (492,000 ha of GM canola plus 282,000 ha of GM cotton = a total 774,000 
ha of GM crops, compared to a total 394,000,000 ha of Australian agriculture land) 
(ABCA, 2019; ABS, 2018; Cotton Australia, 2019). Given the experience of the 
past two decades, there appears to be little prospect of those GMO hectares 
increasing in the immediate future. Ten facets, including social, economic, 
agronomic, commercial and ecological aspects, of the failures of the GMO sector 
are documented. 
 
Social license failure 
Consumers of the world avoid GM foods. A multi-national study of consumers 
(n=23,000) across 17 countries, reported that 60% of Chinese consumers reject GM 
food, for Mexico and Italy the figure is 49%, and for Spain, Russia, France, and 
Brazil the figure is 45% (GfK, 2017).  
 
As elsewhere, the results of community surveys conducted in Australia over more 
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than a decade reveal that GM food and crops have failed to achieve a social 
licence. There is no majority support for GMO food in Australia. In one survey 
(n=1,100), 66% of respondents were either “concerned” (39%) or “alarmed” (27%) 
about “Genetically modified GM foods”, with a further 7% responding as either 
“Neutral” (4%) or “Don’t know” (3%), and only 28% responding that they were 
either “excited (9%) or “hopeful (19%) (MARS, 2011). These results reveal 
community disdain for GMO foods and are consistent with previous similar 
surveys (e.g. MARS, 2008, n=1,100). 
Figure 1. Australian community attitudes to “the use of genetically modified (GM ) 
technology to produce food” (n=1,255) (author's graph; data source: Cormick & 
Mercer, 2017). 
 
A survey commissioned by the OGTR (n=1,255), reported a minority (38%) of the 
community supported GM food and crops. This was consistent with 34% of 
respondents reporting their “willingness to eat GM foods”. Only 10% of 
respondents reported that it was “safe” to grow GM in their own state or territory 
while 68% of respondents reported that it was “not safe” to grow GM in their own 
state or territory (Cormick & Mercer, 2017) (Fig. 1). 
 
Retail failure 
Where manufacturers are required to declare GMO ingredients in their products, 
they opt to avoid such ingredients. For example, GMO food products are required 
to be labelled as such in Australia (FSANZ, 2016). The consequence of this 
labelling requirement is that there are no GMO food products offered for sale in 
Australian supermarkets. The food processors, suppliers, and supermarkets have 
collectively and clearly made the judgement that Australian consumers have no 
appetite for GM foodstuffs in their diet, and that the inclusion of GM ingredients 
would damage their brand. Some products, for example Zafarelli pasta products, 
state on their packaging “Free of Genetic Modification” (Zafarelli pasta is 
Australian made from Australian grown durum wheat). GMO food is absent from 
Australian supermarket shelves and this outcome reflects (a) the food regulation 
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requirement to label GMO ingredients on the pack,  (b) the resistance of Australian 
consumers to buy such products, and (c) the recognition, in the marketplace, of the 
prevailing negative consumer sentiments regarding GMOs. 
 
Price failure 
In the global market place, GMO crops attract a price penalty, in the region of 10% 
to 25% for GM soy (Açıkgöz, 2018). By choice or circumstance, the GM sector 
operates a ‘sell cheap’ price regime. Based on five seasons of data and two delivery 
depots, the price penalty for GM canola in Western Australia is 7.2%. Over the 
seasons and across the depots, the annual price penalty for GM varied from a low 
of 5.3% to a high of 9.2% (Paull, 2019b) (Fig. 2). About 21% of Australian grown 
canola is GM (OGTR, 2018b). For GM cotton, no price comparison is available 
because over 99% of Australia’s cotton is GM (Cotton Australia, 2018). 
Figure 2. Average annual price per tonne of GM canola versus non GM canola 
(graph source: after Paull, 2019b; data source: Taylor, 2019). 
 
Biosecurity failure 
Once introduced into an environment, GMOs are challenging to eliminate or 
contain (Agapito‐Tenfen et al., 2017). Australia’s island state, Tasmania, has the 
strictest biosecurity regime of all Australian states and territories. There has been a 
GMO Moratorium in place fin Tasmania since 2001 and this persists to the present 
time (DPIPWE, 2019).   
In the late 1990s to 2000, Monsanto and Aventis conducted field trials of GM 
canola at 57 sites in Tasmania. The sites have been monitored for the past two 
decades with multiple audits. Every audit has identified rogue canola plants, 
despite containment practices, with the number of plants declining (DPIPWE, 
2014; Paull, 2019d) (Fig. 3).  
These unwelcome GMO intruders into the Tasmanian landscape appear to be 
contained to the original trial sites, but not eliminated, even after two decades of 
auditing and containment practices. The data from the Tasmanian experience show 
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the persistence of GMOs in the landscape and the serious challenge of eliminating 
them once introduced, even in the circumstance here of limited experimental field 
trials which fall well short of commercial release. 
 
Figure 3. Monitoring of the 1990s GMO trial sites continues to find rogue canola 
plants at GMO trial sites in Tasmania even after two decades. 
 
Segregation failure 
Contamination by GMOs of their non-GMO analogues is a global phenomenon 
(Price & Cotter, 2014; Sharratt & Chopra, 2019). Importing countries, including 
China and South Korea, have rejected shipments of produce, including wheat and 
corn, due to GMO contamination (Chung, 2016; Lopez, 2013).  
 
Table 1. The two classes of canola offered in WA as described by the grain handler 
(neither are without GMOs), with a ‘fair description’ added by the present author 
(CBH, 2019). 
Canola 
Grade 
Marketing 
Description 
Specified Characteristics Fair 
Description 
CAN “Non GM 
Canola” 
“Certified GM free to Maximum 
adventitious presence of 0.9% GMO. 
Suitable for Human Consumption and 
Biodiesel production. ISCC EU 
Certified”. 
Canola with 
GM 
contamination  
d 0.9% 
CAG “Canola” “Suitable for Human Consumption and 
Biodiesel production. ISCC EU 
Certified”. 
GM Canola 
 
When an exemption was made to the GM moratorium in Western Australia (WA) 
to allow GM canola in 2010 (Paull, 2015b), the exemption was made on the 
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assurance that GM and non-GM grain could coexist and a grain-handling 
segregation regime could and would avoid contamination of non-GM grain by GM 
grain. This promised segregation has been a failure. The assurances of strict 
segregation promptly failed as the impracticability of strict and effective 
segregation was revealed in practice. The outcome for WA (a state of 2.5 million 
km2, larger than France, Spain, Germany, Portugal, Poland, Italy and UK taken 
together) is that canola exported from WA is graded as ‘CAG’ (= GM canola) or 
‘CAN’ (= non-GM canola but with an allowed contamination by GM canola of up 
to 0.9%) (CBH, 2019). So, although the ‘CAN’ grade is described as ‘non GM’ by 
the grain handler, it is not GM-free (and is not non-GM in the usual usage of the 
language) (Paull, 2019b) (Table 1). This history of ongoing GMO segregation 
failures, in WA along with the biosecurity issues of the persistence of rogue canola 
plants in Tasmania from GMO trials of two decades ago, supports the case that 
GMOs are properly regarded and managed as invasive species (Paull, 2018a). 
 
Stability failure 
The number of countries growing GMOs is shrinking. It appears to have peaked at 
29 countries in 2010, and from there its has shrunk progressively, to 28 in 2012, 26 
in 2016 and to 24 presently (ISAAA, 2010, 2012, 2018). 
 
The second GM crop that is grown in Australia is GM cotton, and most (>99%) of 
Australia’s cotton production is GM cotton (Cotton Australia, 2018). Cotton 
growing is Australia has always been controversial for a variety of reasons, 
including that cotton is a ‘water hungry’ crop and Australia is a dry continent 
where water is precious and droughts are regular, the crop is grown as a broad-acre 
monoculture and relies on ‘crop dusting’ planes to apply a smorgasbord of 
biocides, with the attendant spray drift contaminations exacerbated by the aerial 
application of these toxic chemicals, and with the attendant contentious 
contamination of waterways. GM cotton has been grown in Australia since 1996 
(OGTR, 2018a). In the period since then, the areas sown have varied wildly from 
year to year (Figure 4). Current plantings of cotton in Australia are less than they 
were in 1996/97. The industry does not exhibit any stability but instead exhibits 
erratic fluctuations (from a high of 599,630 ha in 2010, to a low of 68,585 ha in 
2007, to presently 282,000 ha in 2018) (Fig. 4).  
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Figure 4. Cotton plantings in Australia have been erratic (author's graph; data 
source: Cotton Australia, 2019). 
Coexistence failure 
GMO farms have not proved to be ‘good neighbours’ to non-GMO farms (CBC 
News, 2004; McLachlin et al., 2001). GM canola was approved for release in WA 
in 2010 with the assurance that GM and non-GM cops could coexist. This 
immediately proved to be false. That first GM canola crop in WA contaminated a 
neighbouring organic farm, which, as a consequence, lost its organic certification. 
The representation had been made at the time of the initial approval that if there 
were contaminations that there were adequate common law remedies to recover 
losses. When put to the test, this assurance ultimately proved to be false (Paull, 
2015b). The organic farmer (Marsh) sued the GMO farmer (Baxter) for the 
economic loss caused by the loss of the organic premium. The loss was agreed 
between the parties at A$85,000 (US$60,000; €53,000). The liability (but not the 
actual contamination) was contested by the GMO farmer at every legal step, as the 
case moved from the WA Supreme Court, to the WA Court of Appeal, and finally 
to the highest court in the land, the High Court of Australia. The legal costs of the 
GMO farmer were paid by Monsanto. The organic farmer lost the case at every 
step, and costs were awarded against the organic farmer.
 
The Marsh v Baxter case established that (a) GM crops can contaminate a 
neighbouring farm with impunity (the facts of the contamination were not 
contested although the judge preferred to characterise the offending events as 
‘incursions’ rather than ‘contamination’) (Martin, 2014), that (b) there are no 
effective common law remedies for such contamination, and (c) a farmer suing a 
neighbour for losses due to GM contamination faces years of litigation (in this 
case, all fruitless), and risks bankruptcy, since the legal costs of the Marsh v Baxter 
case exceeded A$,2,000,000 (US$1,410,000; €1,250,000) (Paull, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Contamination failure 
Non-GMO farmers bear the burden of GMO on-farm contaminations, and there are 
no ready solutions to this iniquity. Following a change of government in WA in 
2017 (to Labor), there was the acknowledgement that the Marsh v Baxter case 
demonstrated that the common law remedies for GM contamination were deficient. 
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The WA Legislative Council (upper house of the WA bicameral parliament) 
established a Parliamentary Inquiry to consider “mechanisms for compensation for 
economic loss to farmers in Western Australia caused by contamination by 
genetically modified material” (EPAC, 2018). Public submissions were called for, 
and evidence was admitted in a series of hearings. The report of the Inquiry was 
disappointing. Various mechanisms were submitted and considered by the 
committee but none were recommended for implementation (Swinbourn, 2019) 
(Table 2). The committee was unable to determine the extent of contamination 
events occurring across the state. Members observed that the Marsh v Baxter case 
had had a “chilling effect” (e.g. Collins, 2018, p.4; May, 2018, p.9; Paull, 2018b, 
p.6) in silencing farmers experiencing GMO contamination because litigation had 
proved so expensive in terms of time and money in the Marsh v Baxter case and 
had ultimately only achieved further penalisation of the contaminated party.  
Table 2. Options for a compensation mechanism considered (but not progressed) 
by the WA Parliamentary Inquiry (Paull, 2019a). 
 
The Parliamentary Inquiry was the last ‘great hope’ that some good, for the non-
GM farming sector, might come from the WA experience of GM contamination 
and the Marsh v Baxter case. No such happy outcome was achieved. A GMO-
contaminated party faces the prospect of no proven common law remedy and the 
might of Monsanto’s purse (which backed GMO farmer Baxter in court and 
indemnified his risk). It would be a brave and perhaps foolhardy Australian farmer 
who next takes on Monsanto/Bayer GM contamination in the light of the Marsh v 
Baxter case which has now run its course and exhausted its legal options. 
 
Uptake failure 
GMOs account for 3.8% of the world’s agricultural land and although this has been 
creeping up, the adopter base has been shrinking. Globally, the number of countries 
planting GMOs peaked in 2010 (n=29) and has been declining since then (currently 
n=24) (ISAAA, 2010, 2018). Australia's OGTR (established in 2000) has approved 
# Proposed mechanism Result 
A Status quo, i.e. Do nothing The recommended outcome in the Inquiry Report 
B Levy GM industry Not a recommendation in the Inquiry Report 
C Technology Licence Bond Absent in the Inquiry Report 
D Non-GM farmer Insurance Not readily available (or at all) in the marketplace 
E GM farmer Insurance Not readily available (or at all) in the marketplace 
F  Compulsory Third Party (CTP) Not a recommendation in the Inquiry Report 
G Government pays Absent in the Inquiry Report 
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the commercial release of GM cotton since 2002 and GM canola since 2003 
(OGTR, 2019), nevertheless GMOs only account for less than 0.2% of Australian 
agriculture hectares (Fig. 5). 
Figure 5. The distribution of three mutually exclusive types of agriculture in 
Australia. 
 
The percentage of the canola crop in WA that is GM canola has been in decline 
since 2015 (Fig. 6). The most recent figures reveal that GM canola planting has 
declined while total canola plantings have increased: “The proportion of canola 
sown to Roundup Ready varieties contracted to 18% of the area. This was related 
to the increase in canola area (from 1.2 in 2016 to 1.4 million Ha in 2017) … and a 
small decrease in the area of GM canola sown” (Bucat, 2018, p.5).  
Figure 6. Percentage of the WA canola crop that is GM canola. 
 
Glyphosate failure 
Most of the world’s GMOs are herbicide tolerant, with variations of Monsanto’s 
GM Roundup Ready (RR) soy, corn, cotton and canola the most popular (ISAAA, 
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2018). The GM canola crop in Australia is a glyphosate dependent crop 
(Monsanto’s RR canola). Glyphosate is a problematic herbicide, it is a declared 
carcinogen (OEHHA, 2019), it is ingested by adults and children via a variety of 
routes including food and beverages (Cook, 2019), and it is currently under 
consideration of being banned in multiple jurisdictions.  
 
There have recently been several landmark decisions awarding damages for cancer 
caused by glyphosate, in one case, US$80 million (Rosenblatt, 2019), in another, 
US$289 million (Bellon, 2018), and in another, US$2 billion (Davis, 2019). There 
are a further 9,300 more plaintiffs in USA (Bender, 2018). The first lawsuit has 
been filed in Australia, with more forthcoming (Houston & Vedelego, 2019). This 
is a global problem for Monsanto and its new owner Bayer. 
The case for GM canola (RR canola) has been built on foundations that are in the 
process of being swept away in a blizzard of litigation. Glyphosate is a cancer 
causing herbicide that is a faltering cornerstone for the GM industry to have staked 
so much, including reputation, in Australia and elsewhere. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The GMO industry has failed major tests, including, the lack of social licence, 
attracting price penalties, lapses of biosecurity, segregation, stability, coexistence, 
contamination, narrow uptake base and market penetration, and glyphosate 
dependence. Australia offers a microcosm for considering these failures. Australia 
is a major player in global agriculture and in global agriculture exports (Rural 
Bank, 2018), but it is a minor player in the world of GMOs. In line with global 
consumers, the Australian public have failed to concede a social licence to this 
industry and remain skeptical about GMOs. The GM hectares in Australia are in 
decline for the two GM crops, GM canola and GM cotton. There is a price penalty 
for GM canola of 7.2% compared to non GM canola (no comparison figures are 
available for GM cotton versus non GM cotton). GM canola is a glyphosate 
dependent crop and its percentage of the canola crop in Australia may be 
anticipated to plummet now that cancer lawsuits are in propect, if glyphosate use is 
banned, and if glyphosate residues are implemented at zero-tolerance by the 
market.
  
In contrast to the declining GM sector, the organic sector in Australia, and the 
world, is in the ascent and Australian organics now accounts for 51% of the 
world’s certified organic hectares (Paull, 2019c). Australia is far from the world’s 
loci of pollution, and has many other natural advantages for ‘clean and green’ food 
and fibre production. GMO farming puts at risk ‘Brand Australia’ as a clean and 
green source of premium food and fibre. Extrapolating from present trends, we 
may foresee GMO production further retreating in Australia, as resistance is 
maintained within Australia and rejection is entrenched and increasing 
internationally as discerning markets and consumers say ‘no’ to GMO imports.  
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